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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-2575
__________
BARBARA LOUIS,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-01191)
District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 24, 2020
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed April 14, 2020)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Barbara Louis, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying her request for review of
the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for supplemental security
income (SSI). For the following reasons, we will affirm.
Louis filed for SSI benefits effective September 11, 2013, when she was 36 years
old. Her disability claim was predicated on physical ailments, including lower back and
knee pain, and mental health impairments, including bipolar disorder and depression.
Her application was denied at the initial level of administrative review. Pursuant to her
request, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in 2016. In 2017,
the ALJ rendered an unfavorable decision, and the Appeals Council denied her request
for review. Louis, represented by counsel, filed a civil action in the District Court,
seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. The District Court,
adopting the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation (R&R), affirmed the
Commissioner’s decision, and this appeal ensued.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the Commissioner’s legal conclusions and review the ALJ’s factual findings to
determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. Allen v. Barnhart, 417
F.3d 396, 398 (3d Cir. 2005). The substantial evidence standard is “more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation
2

marks and citation omitted). We are precluded from reweighing the evidence or making
our own factual determinations. See Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356,
359 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401).
A claimant suffers from a “disability” as defined in the Social Security Act if she
is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation
process for determining whether a claimant is disabled, pursuant to 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920.1 In doing so, the ALJ considered Louis’s physical, psychological, and
consultative examinations, medical treatment, and testimony. After finding that Louis
was not involved in substantial gainful activity, the ALJ determined that Louis had a
severe impairment of degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease, osteoarthritis,
obesity, affective disorders, anxiety, and schizoaffective disorder, but that none of these
impairments met or was medically equivalent to any presumptive disabling listed
impairment. The ALJ further concluded that although Louis was limited in her ability to
perform basic work activities, she retained the RFC to perform sedentary work. In so

1

Under the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant (1)
is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a “severe” medical impairment; (3) has
an impairment that would render her per se disabled; (4) retains “residual functional
capability” (RFC) to perform past work; and (5) can perform any other work considering
her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
3

concluding, the ALJ determined Louis’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of the pain associated with her impairments to be inconsistent with
the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.
Louis raised three challenges to the ALJ’s decision before the District Court: that
the ALJ did not reasonably explain her RFC assessment, that she rejected medical
opinion evidence without reasonable explanation, and that she failed to reasonably
explain her rejection of written statements from a lay witness. The District Court
determined that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. After a
thorough review of the administrative record, we agree.2
We first address Louis’s contention that the ALJ failed to adequately support her
RFC assessment. The “residual functioning capacity” is the most a claimant “is still able
to do despite the limitations caused by . . . her impairments.” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247
F.3d 34, 40 (3d Cir. 2001). Although a claimant bears the burden of establishing her
RFC, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a), the ALJ makes the ultimate disability and RFC

2

We construe Louis’s informal brief liberally to argue that the ALJ’s decision is
unsubstantiated for the reasons she argued in the District Court. See United States v.
Otero, 502 F.3d 331, 334 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that pro se pleadings are construed
liberally). However, we will not entertain the arguments that she raises for the first time
on appeal, including that she is currently receiving homecare services and suffers from
asthma, as they are waived, see Smith v. Comm’r Soc. Sec, 631 F.3d 632 (3d Cir. 2010),
and we find no circumstances here warranting an exception to this long-standing rule.
See Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592-93 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that where a
claimant brings new evidence, remand is appropriate only if it is material and good cause
is shown for failing to previously present it).
4

determinations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 404.1546(c); Chandler v. Comm’r Soc.
Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011).
The ALJ determined that Louis retained the RFC to perform sedentary work as
defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a) except:
She can occasionally kneel and crawl; she can occasionally
be exposed to unprotected heights and moving mechanical
parts; she can perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks
but not at a production rate pace, she is limited to simple
work-related decisions; she can occasionally interact with
supervisors and coworkers but can never interact with the
public; and she can tolerate occasional changes in work
setting[.]
ALJ Op. at 23. We first reject out of hand Louis’s assertion that the RFC assessment was
merely a summary of the evidence lacking sufficient explanation. The ALJ’s RFC
assessment was approximately seven pages long; the narrative discussion highlighted key
medical and non-medical evidence, noting inconsistencies and distinguishing the
evidence which supported the result. The ALJ gave detailed reasons for discounting
certain opinion evidence and crediting others, and she explained how she accounted for
specific evidence to support certain elements of her RFC assessment. As the District
Court’s more detailed analysis makes clear, the ALJ’s RFC assessment was sufficiently
supported by the record.
Physical Impairments
With respect to the physical RFC, Louis contends that the ALJ failed to provide a
sufficient basis for rejecting Dr. Floyretta Pinkard’s medical opinion evidence. In April
5

2014, Pinkard performed a physical consultative examination of Louis and found that she
had a normal gait, could walk on heels and toes without difficulty, could squat to 75%,
was able to get on and off the examining table and to rise from a chair without difficulty.
Pinkard also found that Louis’s bilateral straight-leg tests were negative, and that she had
no evidence of joint deformity or tenderness and no bilateral knee or leg tenderness.
Louis was found to have moderate left lumbar paraspinal muscle spasm and tenderness,
but full normal 5/5 strength in her upper and lower extremities with normal sensation and
reflexes and intact finger and hand dexterity with normal 5/5 grip strength. R 454-466.
Finally, Pinkard noted that Louis could handle her personal care on a daily basis, and that
she could cook, clean, do laundry and shop on a weekly basis. In a “Medical Source
Statement of Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Physical),” Pinkard opined, in
pertinent part, that Louis could never stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl. R. at 461.3 The ALJ
gave “little weight” to Pinkard’s opinion after concluding that it was unsupported by the
other physical examinations in the record.

3

Louis argues that a determination that a claimant can never stoop requires a decision of
disabled pursuant to Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-9p. That Ruling, which addresses
the effect postural and other non-exertional limitations have on the sedentary
occupational base, recognizes that “[a] complete inability to stoop would significantly
erode the unskilled sedentary occupational base and a finding that the individual is
disabled would usually apply.” SSR 96-9p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34478-01 (July 2, 1996). The
Ruling does not mandate a finding of disability; rather it instructs that “consultation with
a vocational resource may be particularly useful” in cases where the claimant “is limited
to less than occasional stooping.” Id.; see also Lauer v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 489, 493 (7th
Cir. 1999) (“There is no basis to assert that SSR96-9 requires a finding of disability in
cases where a claimant is unable to stoop.”).
6

Although Dr. Pinkard’s opinion must be treated as expert opinion evidence by a
non-examining source, the ALJ was not bound by Pinkard’s findings. See SSR 96-6p.
Whether or not Louis can perform occupational duties is a legal determination reserved
for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). While we agree with Louis that
Pinkard’s assessment was consistent with the other examinations in the record in many
respects, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the severe functional
limitations found by Pinkard were inconsistent with the medical record as a whole. As
the ALJ noted, Louis’s treatment records, which include radiology reports of x-ray and
MRI results, indicate that she had bilateral knee osteoarthritis which was repeatedly
described as “mild” or “minimal.” See R. at 538, 539, 541, 568-69, 570, 587, 589, 626,
696; see also Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that treating
physicians’ reports are entitled to greater weight than non-treating physicians’ or a onetime examiner’s). And contrary to Louis’s contention, the record is replete with
treatment records indicating that the range of motion in her knees was generally within
normal limits.4 R. at 538, 541, 626, 635, 638-43, 698.5 Indeed, an orthopedic specialist,
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The treatment notes from 2012 do not, as Louis maintains, indicate an issue with lower
extremity range of motion. See R. 425, 432.
5

Some of these reports, which the ALJ relied on, are authored by a Physician’s
Assistant. See, e.g., R. at 721-723. Only licensed physicians and certain other qualified
specialists are considered “[a]cceptable medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a); SSR
06–03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *1 (Aug. 9, 2006). Physician's assistants are defined as
“other sources,” and while not entitled to the same deference, they are entitled to some
7

Dr. Gene Shaffer, “reassure[d]” Louis of the “lack of mechanical issues” with the knee
and recommended the “continued conservative arthritic knee care.” R. at 643; see
Mason, 994 F.2d at 1066-67 (noting that a medical specialist’s opinion is entitled to
greater deference than that of a non-specialist).
With regard to her history of back pain, an MRI revealed that Louis had “broad
based disc protrusion at L4-L5 . . . with only a small focal midline disc herniation,” and a
radiologic examination indicated “[m]ild spondylosis” and “[f]acet arthritis in the lower
lumbar spine.” R. at 526, 590. Although she had decreased range of motion and muscle
spasms, she consistently had negative straight-leg raising tests, and normal sensations and
muscle strength. See, e.g., R. at 584, 657, 668. Most notably, Louis responded well to
conservative treatment and her condition improved. In July 2015, she received a medial
branch nerve block injection in her lumbar spine; afterwards, her treating physician noted
that the “pain relief was significant.” R. at 665-666. In a follow-up visit, she reported
that “her back feels much better.” R. at 662. As the ALJ observed, from then until her
decision, there was a “rather long treatment gap for [Louis’s] degenerative disc disease.”6

weight. Id. at *2-4; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b). Notably, the physician’s assistant reports
indicate that she was working “under the direct supervision” of a physician. See Molina
v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2012). In any event, her findings are
consistent with those made separately by treating physicians and specialists. See, e.g., R.
at 568, 570, & 643.
6
Although Louis complained of back pain in September and October 2015, she was
determined “to be getting medication from multiple doctors. Paying with insurance on
some and paying cash on others.” She was discharged from the practice. R. at 657-58.
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In sum, the overall medical evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that the degree
of Louis’s physical functional limitations was less than that found by Pinkard.
Mental Impairments
Next, Louis contends that the ALJ did not reasonably explain her decision to
discount medical opinion evidence that the severity of her bipolar disorder rendered her
unable to work. Specifically, she maintains that the ALJ assigned too much weight to the
opinion of Dr. Urbanowicz, the non-examining consultative examiner, and too little
weight to Dr. David Frankel, her treating psychiatrist, and Dr. David Waid, an examining
consultant. We disagree. See Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981) ("We
are also cognizant that when the medical testimony or conclusions are conflicting, the
ALJ is not only entitled but required to choose between them.").
In a letter dated July 20, 2012, Dr. David Frankel, a psychiatrist who had been
treating Louis for two years,7 stated:
Ms. Louis has been taking medication to control her
symptoms. Nonetheless, she still has breakthroughs.
It. Is (sic) not difficult for Ms. Louis to lose control,
become angry, shout, and be unable to be redirected.
The last time she did this was over a mistake in
scheduling. I do not believe that Ms. Louis would be
able to withstand pressures, and directives in a work
situation. It would be hard to work with someone
whose mood and behavior cannot be counted on.

7

Frankel started treating Louis in 2010, when she presented complaining of chronic
depression, anxiety, and panic attacks, as well as psychotic symptoms, including visual
and auditory hallucinations.
9

R. at 367. The ALJ gave “partial weight” to this letter-opinion because, although
Frankel was a treating source, the letter was written before Louis’s application date and
alleged onset date, and because it was found to be inconsistent with the objective medical
record, which included Frankel’s treatment notes through 2016 which indicate that Louis
has “done well on [the medications],” has become “asymptomatic,” and has remained
“stable for a long period of time.” R. at 516-17, 543-44. The “ALJ may consider all
evidence of record, including medical records and opinions dated prior to the alleged
onset date, when there is no evidence of deterioration or progression of symptoms.”
Pirtle v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 931, 934 (3d Cir. 2007); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.912
(requiring a claimant to provide medical evidence of an impairment, its severity, and how
it affects her functioning “for any period in question”). It cannot be disputed that, in the
four years after Frankel rendered that opinion, his treatment notes document a marked
and dramatic improvement with regard to Louis’s mental health. R. at 517 (noting that
Louis “has been able to remain euthymic, not psychotic, and [her] anxiety is under
control”). As the record indicates, Louis was consistently calm and cooperative upon
exam, and her prognosis was “good.” R. at 517, 544. The ALJ was therefore entitled to
discount Frankel’s 2012 assessment where it was undermined by the more “detailed,
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longitudinal picture” provided by his later medical assessments. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2).8
These treatment records also support the ALJ’s decision to discount the
consultative psychiatric evaluation performed by Waid on January 7, 2014. R. at 447450. Waid’s opinion was based solely on his examination of Louis and information that
she provided at the time. He reported that Louis was “highly irritable and suspicious, but
cooperative.” She was “paranoid, delusional” and experiencing auditory hallucinations
during the evaluation. Her intellectual functioning was described as limited. Waid stated
that the “results of the present evaluation appear to be consistent with psychiatric
problems that would significantly impair the claimant’s ability to function with others on
a daily basis.”
In a “Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities
(Physical),” Waid opined that, in light of her mental impairments, Louis’s ability to
interact with the public was extremely limited, her ability to interact with supervisors was
markedly limited, and her ability to interact with co-workers was markedly to extremely
limited. R at 452. He also concluded that her ability to follow instructions was mildly

The record supports the ALJ’s decision to give “partial weight” to the GAF score of 46
assessed by Frankel, which indicates serious symptoms or impairment. As the ALJ
noted, a GAF score provides only a snapshot of a claimant’s level of functioning and is
an unreliable indicator of a claimant’s overall disability status. See Sizemore v.
Berryhill, 878 F.3d 72, 82 (4th Cir. 2017). Louis’s GAF score was assessed in 2010,
prior to her alleged onset date, and at the beginning of her treatment with Dr. Frankel.
See R. at 377.
11
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impaired, but her ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions and to
understand, remember, and carry out complex instructions was markedly limited.
The ALJ was entitled to ascribe only “partial weight” to Waid’s opinion because it was
“based on a one-time evaluation” of Louis and the treatment records since that time show
“far less severe findings upon exam.” ALJ Op. at 28.
Louis relies on this Court’s decision in Morales v. Apfel, in arguing that the fact
that she is clinically stable and medication compliant does not necessarily support the
conclusion that she can return to work. 225 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 2000). In Morales,
the ALJ rejected a treating physician’s conclusion “that Morales’s mental impairment
rendered him markedly limited in a number of relevant work-related activities” based on
the ALJ’s personal observations of Morales at the administrative hearing, evidence that
he was malingering, and the same physician’s notations that Morales was “stable and
well controlled with medication.” Id. at 317, 319. In contrast, Dr. Frankel’s opinion that
Louis could not withstand the pressures of work was made at an earlier point in her
treatment when she was still experiencing psychotic “breakthroughs.” R. at 367; cf.
Brownawell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 352, 356 (3d Cir. 2008) (reversing where
the ALJ’s reliance on the physician’s treatment note that the claimant’s symptoms were
stable with medication went against that physician’s coinciding conclusion that the
claimant was disabled). And after years of treatment, there were years of records noting
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Louis’s stability and lack of any symptoms. Moreover, the ALJ’s determination that
Louis’s mental impairment did not prevent her from engaging in substantial gainful
activity – the relevant inquiry – was supported by other objective evidence in the record,
including that she was consistently noted to be calm and cooperative, reportedly got
along with immediate family,9 friends, and neighbors, could shop in stores by herself,
attended community events, and had consistently normal findings with her cognition,
memory, speech, judgment and insight.10 See Morales, 225 F.3d at 319; R. at 517, 544.
Finally, Louis challenges the ALJ’s decision to give “partial weight” to the two
third-party function reports submitted by her mother. See R. at 284-291, 292-300. The
ALJ thoroughly discussed these reports but discounted them in part because her mother
was not an acceptable medical source or a disinterested party. ALJ OP. at 29. Even
assuming it was error to rely on these bases, the error was harmless. See Brown v.
Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). The ALJ discounted Louis’s mother’s reports
because they were inconsistent with the previously discussed objective medical evidence

9

Although the records indicate that Louis reported getting along with her family, she
testified before the ALJ that she does not speak to her brothers and sisters. See R. at 7576.
10

This record evidence was the basis for Dr. Urbanowicz’s opinion, which the ALJ gave
“great weight,” that Louis was capable of performing a wide range of simple, unskilled
tasks in a regular work environment despite her mental impairment. R. at 94-109.
Specifically, Urbanowicz concluded that Louis was moderately limited in her ability to
maintain attention, concentration, persistence, or pace, and moderately limited in her
ability to carry out detailed instructions and to interact with the general public, coworkers
and supervisors. R. at 107-08.
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and medical opinions. This reason was sufficient by itself to support the ALJ’s decision.
See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (“An ALJ need only give
germane reasons for discrediting the testimony of lay witnesses. Inconsistency with
medical evidence is one such reason.”) (internal citation omitted). Moreover, we agree
with the District Court that the ALJ’s RFC assessment accommodated Louis’s limitations
in concentration, persistence, and pace to the extent that her mother’s testimony in these
areas was consistent with the record.
For these reasons, and in light of our overall examination of the record, we agree
with the District Court that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision to deny
Louis’s SSI application. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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